Introduction
The aim of this paper is to search for asymmetric effects in the reaction function of the National Bank of Poland (NBP). We check whether the Polish monetary policy rule is asymmetric concerning levels of the fundamental macroeconomic variables: inflation and output gap. Encompassing the asymmetric elements in the reaction function might give better explanation of the central bank's behavior. This, in turn, could help to form better expectations and forecasts and could be used to build more accurate econometric models of the economy.
If we assume that a central bank has quadratic loss function in the inflation and output gaps and minimizes it subject to linear structure of economy than we will obtain a linear reaction function. However, positive and negative deviations of inflation and output from the reference levels seem to be treated by monetary authorities differently.
On the one hand, central banks may have asymmetric preferences. Some central banks attempt to stabilize output fluctuations accepting inflation being more volatile, it is because they might face some political heat or social pressure. These banks would have greater aversion to recessions than to expansions. Other central banks might be focused on inflation stabilization (e.g. strict inflation targeters) and have greater aversion to high than low inflation because, for instance, they need to build credibility after implementing inflation targeting strategy. Cukierman and Muscatelii (2008) distinguish recession avoidance preferences (RAP) and inflation avoidance preferences (IAP). In the former a central bank takes more precautions against negative output gaps, while in the latter against positive inflation gaps. Such asymmetric preferences lead to nonlinear reaction functions, as the authors show RAP leads to concave Taylor rule while IAP to convex rule in both the inflation and output gaps.
On the other hand, central banks might take into account asymmetries in different channels of the monetary transmission process. Most importantly, the aggregate supply curve might be nonlinear. In empirical studies it is often argued that when the output gap is positive it has positive impact on inflation, while when the output gap is negative it has very small deflationary impact (Laxton et al. 1999 , Pyyhtia 1999 Introduction N a t i o n a l B a n k o f P o l a n d 4 lead to nonlinear interest rate policy as well (see Dolado et al. 2004 ). Therefore central banks might be more aggressive when the output gap reaches a certain threshold and more cautious when the output gap is small.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In the next section a brief review of the literature concerning symmetric Taylor rule and asymmetric effects in both Taylor rule and Phillips curve is made. Section 2 and 3 present our data set and empirical strategy.
Section 4 reports the empirical results. The last section concludes.
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1 Literature review
Studies on the Taylor rule
Originally Taylor (1993) specified a simple monetary policy rule:
where i t is the central bank policy rate, i * is an equilibrium real interest rate, π t is the rate of inflation over the previous four quarters, π * is the inflation target of the central bank, y t is the percent deviation of the real GDP from its trend. Taylor (1993) analyzes the federal funds rate during 1987-1992 and finds out that it is closely approximated by the rule with parameters i * = 2, π * = 2, γ = β π = 0, 5. Thus, the central bank rate tends to increase when the inflation is above its target value and when the actual output is above the potential output.
The original Taylor rule has been modified in various ways. The adjustment of the monetary policy rate appears not to be immediate. Central banks dislike jumps and tend to smooth adjustments in their interest rates (Judd and Rudebusch (1998) ). Therefore, the Taylor rule is often extended by a lagged interest rate term for instance as in the equation below (it is partial adjustment mechanism Clarida et al. 1998):
i t = (1 − ρ)(α + β(π t − π * ) + γy t ) + ρi t−1 .
The central bank's rate seems to depend on forecasts. The effects of the change of a monetary policy rate appear with delay 1 . If the monetary authorities take into account these delays than they should set their rates according to future movements of inflation and output gap. Clarida et al. (2000) suggest a following forward looking rule:
where Ω t denotes an information set at time t, y t+m is an output gap between period t and t + m, π t+k is a percent change in a price level between periods t and t + k.
Moreover, many economists argue that standard monetary policy rules should be augmented by other macroeconomic variables because central banks seem to look on the broader set of factors. It is often proposed to extend the standard rule by: exchange rate, monetary aggregates, asset prices, long term and foreign interest rates. However, Literature review N a t i o n a l B a n k o f P o l a n d N a t i o n a l B a n k o f P o l a n d far as the level of inflation is concerned. Moreover, the analysis shows that NBP seems to be asymmetric along the business cycle as the output gap coefficient is insignificant in the regime below the threshold value and significant above it. The author's interpretation is that the output gap affects NBP's inflation forecasts which are the driver of interest rate setting. In addition, the calculations show that when financial stress is high there is no response to inflation and when it is low the response is positive. The author suggests that the real economy raises concerns only when the inflation stress is low.
Studies on the Phillips curve
As it was mentioned before a nonlinear monetary policy reaction function might stem from nonlinear Philips curve. The Phillips curve has generally been estimated in a linear framework 2 , even though the original work of Phillips (1958) and many other theoretical works pointed to nonlinear relationship.
Many economists argue that the relation between inflation and output gap is nonlinear, therefore the cost of disinflation is changing. Often the Phillips curve seems to be convex. If the economy is overheated an decrease of economic activity causes faster disinflation (cost of fighting inflation is low), while in the contrary when the economy is in recession further decreases of economic activity do not cause much disinflation (cost of fighting inflation is high).
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There are many reasons for the nonlinear Phillips curve. For instance, workers are resistant to nominal wage cuts, what causes downward rigidity of nominal wages. It is particularly problematic when the level of inflation is low, because when the inflation rate is high it might be enough to keep the nominal wages constant for some time to decrease the wages. Thus, the central bank to restore the balance on the labor market might tolerate higher inflation. Even long run Philips curve might be down-sloping (in the inflation-unemployment space) because of money illusion (Akerlof et al., 1996) , people use to think in nominal terms, therefore in a period of high inflation firms can set lower real wages and hire more workers.
Moreover, firms may face capacity constraints in the short run. When the economy is strong the capacity constraints restrict firms to increase output and encourage them to increase prices, in contrast when the economy is weak it is easier for firms to increase output, what causes a convex Philips curve.
Costly price adjustment (Ball et al. 1988 , Dotsey et al. 1999 ) are another explanation.
Any change in firms' activity is costly, therefore firms might be reluctant to make it.
When the level of inflation is high demand shock is expected to have more impact on increasing prices and less on increasing production.
Also volatility of aggregate demand and supply shocks (Lucas 1973 ) might cause some asymmetric effects. Economic entities do not know if any price change is caused by a change in the economy wide aggregate demand or by a change in relative product demand and thus, they are unable to distinguish between changes in general prices and changes in relative prices. The higher the volatility of inflation the more of price changes are assigned to general prices. Therefore, not only the level of inflation but also its stability is an important aspect for monetary authorities.
There are not only studies which show that the Philips curve is convex, some studies point that it might be concave. It might be concave because firms facing monopolistic competition are more willing to reduce prices under weak demand (when the output gap is negative) than to increase them under high demand to avoid being overtaken by rival firms (Stiglitz, 1997).
Filardo (1998) point out that the Philips curve might be convex when the output gap is positive and concave when the output gap is negative. The author shows that the cost of fighting inflation is higher when the economy is weak (5% of output gap) than when it is overheated (2, 1%). Moreover, in both the weak and the overheated economy this cost is higher than it results from the linear model.
Data description
N a t i o n a l B a n k o f P o l a n d In the case of a monetary policy rule estimation an important aspect of the data selection process is determining the dependent variable. The Polish monetary policy rate is usually adjusted by multiples of 25 basis points and the decisions concerning its level are taken once a month. Taking into account this discreteness we decided to concentrate on the money market rate, which is more variable and determines the real rate of making transactions. The Polish central bank reference rate and the money market rates move almost in line during the examined time period (see Figure 1 ). In the study we will use the 1 week money market rate -WIBOR 1W as dependent variable.
All data are obtain from the webpage of the Polish Central Statistical Office or the National Bank of Poland database. Let as denote the other time series used in the estimations:
• cpi1 -year on year consumer price index;
• cpi2 -quarter on quarter consumer price index, seasonally adjusted;
• cpia -the deviation of cpi from the actual inflation target;
• cpib -the deviation of cpi from its smoothed by Hodrick Prescott filter trend of inflation (i.e. cpi1);
• gap -the difference between logarithm of the seasonally adjusted measure of GDP and the trend obtained by Hodrick Prescott filter, GDP is disaggregated to monthly frequencies; We use Fernandez method to disaggregate quarterly data into monthly frequencies (cf. Fernandez, 1981) . We use an output gap computed for monthly industrial production index to augment the related series. Moreover, we lengthen the time series by AR(2) process to diminish the role of last observations.
• reer -difference between logarithm of real effective exchange rate deflated by CPI (which is calculated by the National Bank of Poland) and the trend obtained by Hodrick Prescott filter;
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• inf e1 -inflation expectations of Polish bank analysts for forecasting horizon of 12 months from the survey conducted by Reuters;
• inf e2 -inflation expectations of Polish consumers for forecasting horizon of 12 months, calculated from the survey conducted by Ipsos (cf. Łyziak and Stanisławska
2006);
• ∆ieuro -the change of 1 month EURIBOR.
The graphs of the applied variables are presented in Figure 1 in the Appendix. N a t i o n a l B a n k o f P o l a n d 12 3
3 Methods of estimation and testing
The Phillips curve estimation
Before proceeding with the analysis of the Taylor rule we examine nonlinearities in the Polish Philips curve. We do only a preliminary analysis and further studies are needed when using different measures of inflation and output gap as well as different specifications of the Philips curve. As the main aim of this paper is to analyse possible asymmetries in the Taylor rule, the estimations of the Phillips curve aim to show if the asymmetries in the Taylor rule might stem from the nonlinear relation between the inflation rate and the level of economic activity. Therefore, to obtain comparable results we use similar data in both the Phillips curve and the Taylor rule estimations. It means that when estimating the Philips curve we consider monthly data. We consider two measures of inflation: year on year CPI as the central bank target is maintaining this rate at the relevant level and quarter on quarter CPI as such rate is most often used and enables better economic explanation from independent variables to CPI.
We use GMM estimation method with lagged values of the measure of inflation, output gap, exchange rate gap and inflation expectations of the Polish customers and bank analysts as instruments.
We estimate the New Keynesian hybrid Phillips curve with forward and backward looking components of expected price movements, output gap and exchange rate passthrough:
where: π t is an inflation rate measured by cpi1 or cpi2, y t is an output gap measured by gap, e t is an exchange rate gap measured by reer. Ω t in this and other equations denotes an information set at time t. Various combinations of the lead and lag values (i.e. k, n, m) will be tested, where k, n, m ∈ {3, 4, . . . , 12} and the model which fits the data best will be chosen.
Next, the asymmetries concerning the level of output gap are tested in the two following ways:
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where:
In the Equation (2) we concern the case when the whole Phillips curve rule changes according to the value of the threshold variable. Whereas in the Equation (3) 
The Taylor rule estimation
We then turn to an analysis of the Polish Taylor rule. We consider two models with two different measures of inflation target (cpia and cpib) to check the robustness of the results.
As previously, to allow for correlation between the error term and the forward looking variables, we use GMM method with instruments such as lagged values of the inflation gap, the output gap, the domestic short term interest rate as well as the short term interest rate in the euro area, and the real effective exchange rate.
Firstly, we estimate the symmetric Taylor rule as in the following equation:
where: i t is the one week Polish money market rate (Wibor 1W), π * is an inflation target, measured as the actual inflation target (cpia) or the smoothed by Hodrick Prescott N a t i o n a l B a n k o f P o l a n d
14

3
filter trend of actual inflation (cpib), y t is the output gap. We choose the lead values h ∈ {3, 4, . . . , 12} and l ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 3} which fit the model best.
Next, we estimate the asymmetric Taylor rules. Namely, we estimate the threshold model for the Polish monetary reaction function as:
where
0 otherwise,
0 otherwise, and m t and n t are the threshold variables in period t, in our case it is the inflation gap or the output gap. As far as the Equation (7) is concerned we consider the case where m t = n t and m t denotes the inflation gap and n t denotes the output gap. It means that the central bank responds asymmetrically to the level of inflation gap depending on the value of inflation gap but not depending on the value of the output gap and opposite, in the same time the central bank responds asymmetrically to the level of the output gap depending on the value of the output gap but not depending on the value of the inflation gap. We consider also the case when J t = 1 for each t and m t is an inflation gap, that is an asymmetry according only to the inflation gap, and the case when I t = 1 for each t and n t is an output gap, that is the asymmetry according only to the level of output gap.
The choice of the threshold value
In both the estimations of the Taylor rule and the Phillips curve we consider two cases of known and unknown threshold values. In case of unknown parameter we estimate the threshold value using the procedure presented in Caner and Hansen (2004) . The threshold value is the one that minimizes the sum of the square errors (S n ) of the 2SLS estimation, i.e.:τ
We draw the LR-like statistics:
The shape of this statistic indicates the strength of the threshold effect. When the LR statistic line has a clearly defined minimum (a V-shaped line) it means that the threshold effect is strong. Whereas, when it has irregular shape it is an indication of weaker threshold effects. The critical value cuts off the interval of all possible threshold values.
We compute the Sup test proposed by Caner and Hansen (2004) . This test is often used to test the presence of threshold effects (see Bunzel and Enders (2010) or Mandler (2011)). To do so we estimate by GMM the Equation (2) or (6), respectively, for a fixed value τ ∈ Γ. Then we calculate the Wald statistic for H 0 :
we denote it by W n (τ ). We repeat this calculation for all τ ∈ Γ and the Sup statistic is then the largest value of these statistics, SupW = sup τ ∈Γ W n (τ ).
The asymptotic distribution of this statistic is not chi-square as the parameter τ is not identified under the null hypothesis. Therefore, we need to calculate it by simulation (so-called bootstrapping). We define pseudodependent variable¯ t (τ )η t where¯ t (τ ) is the error term for the Equation (2) or (6) and η t is i.i.d. N (0, 1). We repeat the calculations for the pseudodependent variable in place of i t for the unrestricted model. The resulting statistic SupW * has the needed asymptotic distribution.
In the case of known threshold parameter we use the chosen quantiles of the output gap or inflation gap. For the Phillips curve it is τ = 0 or τ = 0,7 quantile of the measure of the output gap, which correspond to the regimes of positive and negative output gap and the regime of very high output gap. For the Taylor rule these are medians of the the measures of output gap and inflation gap, which divide the sample into two equal subsamples.
Empirical results
N a t i o n a l B a n k o f P o l a n d
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Empirical results
The unit root tests show that the analyzed variables can be treated as stationary in the period from 01:2000 to 05:2012. We present the results of ADF, PP, and KPSS tests in Table 9 in the Appendix. For each of the variables at least one test indicates stationarity.
A preliminary analysis of the nonlinear Philips curves
As a benchmark we estimate a linear Philips curve. Table 1 Both specifications seem to us to be correct, and thus we estimate both of them to check the robustness of the results. In both models all coefficients are statistically significant and have the expected signs. The decrease of e t means depreciation of the Polish zloty. Therefore, the relation between the level of inflation (π t ) and the measure of an exchange rate gap (e t−4 ) is Hansen's sup-Wald statistic shows if there are any threshold effects if the sample is divided into two subsamples depending on the level of a threshold variable. In our cases the reported values of the test indicate strong threshold effect in both models, so it appears that the reaction of the inflation rate is different when the output gap is relatively high and when it is relatively low. As far as the threshold value is concerned, the LR statistics presented in Figure 3 show quite different values for the two models.
The evidence of threshold effect seem to be weaker for the first model, as the shape of the LR line is more irregular and it has two possible minimums. Whereas, for the second model the statistic is more V-shaped with one clearly defined minimum.
Next we proceed to test the asymmetric effects by estimation of the Equations (2), (3), and (4) (see Tables 2, 3 , and 4), thus, we apply the three methods of testing. The results seem to strongly depend on the applied base periods (i.e. the previous quarter or the previous year). Indeed, the asymmetric effects are quite different for the two estimated models. In case of the first model the level of inflation seems to be influenced by the measure of economic activity more strongly when the level of economic activity is high.
However, in case of the second model, the conclusion is opposite, the level of inflation seems to depend on the measure of economic activity more strongly when the level of economic activity is low. But simultaneously in this case the coefficient of expected inflation seems to increase, what might indicate that for longer term inflation the role of expectations is more significant, especially when the output gap is high. Thus, these are rather inflation expectations not the level of economic activity which affect the rate of inflation.
At first we will discuss the results for the first model. In this case (see Table 2 ) the coefficient of output gap is higher when the output gap is above the threshold value than when it is below (α 1 > α 2 ). It indicates that the Polish Phillips curve might be convex.
As it was discussed earlier a stronger reaction of a rate of inflation when a high level of output gap is observed might stem from nominal wage rigidities, capacity constraints, costly price adjustments or volatility of economic shocks. Moreover, it seems that the exchange rate pass-through is slightly higher when the level of economic activity is high Empirical results N a t i o n a l B a n k o f P o l a n d
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than when the level of economic activity is low (|φ 1 | > |φ 2 |). More advanced study of this effect in Poland was carried out by Przystupa and Wróbel (2009) . They argue that the asymmetry along the business cycle might be caused by behaviour of firms which set their investment decisions according to expected profits, which are the highest in the early expansion and the lowest in the early recession. Furthermore, when applying the second estimation method (see Table 3 ), where we assume that the threshold value is known and equal to 0 or 0,7 quantile of the output gap, the results point to the same conclusion. The reaction of inflation is stronger to high level of economic activity than to low level of economic activity, nevertheless, in this case the effect is not statistically significant. Indeed, the Wald test do not reject the hypothesis that α 1 = α 2 . Similarly, in the third method (see Table 4 ) we obtain positive nonlinear coefficient (α 1 ), what could indicate convex Phillips curve, but the coefficient is also statistically insignificant.
Concerning the second model, the asymmetric effects also seem to be significant, as they are confirmed by all three methods. But the results for the second model are opposite to the results for the first model. The coefficient of output gap is higher when the output gap is below the threshold value than when it is above (α 1 < α 2 ) (see Table 2 and Table 3 ). The Wald tests reject the hypothesis that α 1 = α 2 . Thus, we can confirm the thesis that the reaction of inflation rate is stronger when the level of economic activity is relatively low than when it is high. In addition by estimating the Equation (4) (see Table 5 ) we obtain α 1 , the nonlinear component, statistically significant and negative. N a t i o n a l B a n k o f P o l a n d 20 4
The symmetric Taylor rules
We begin the analysis of the Polish Taylor rule with estimating the symmetric monetary policy rules. We consider two models to check if the results change when applying different measures of inflation target. Model 1 uses the actual inflation target and model 2 uses the HP filter of inflation (CPI). We estimated also the models with inflation expectations (inf e1 and inf e2) instead of the inflation gap (measured by cpia or cpib) 4 , however, we obtained less statistically significant inflation coefficients, what might indicate that the Polish central bank looks on the shorter term inflation forecasts. Indeed, the selected lead length of inflation gap is 3 months. The results for all specifications of the symmetric monetary policy rule are presented in Table 5 . The lagged interest rate term ρ is statistically significant in all equations. The coefficient is very close to unity, it oscillates from 0,96 to 0,97. The ρ coefficient measures the extend of monetary policy inertia and its significant value is interpreted as the desire of the central bank to smooth interest rate adjustment process and indicates persistent policy of the central bank. The smoothing coefficient absorbs serial correlation, which in case of the interest rates in monthly frequency is substantial. Moreover, high value of the smoothing coefficient might stem from the omission of other persistent variables and exogenous shocks (Rudebusch, 2002 (Rudebusch, , 2006 . Therefore, the interpretation of the smoothing parameter is not straightforward. All coefficients have expected signs. The coefficients on inflation and output gap are positive and significant at conventional levels.
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The Polish central bank probably takes into account more information than the inflation and output gaps when setting its interest rate. But we decided to present the results for the Taylor rule without the additional variables due to relatively small number of observations as well as the suggestions of Przystupa and Wróbel (2006) . However, the real effective exchange rate and the short term euro area interest rate are taken as instruments in our GMM estimations.
The sup-Wald statistics presented in Table 5 reject the null hypothesis of no threshold effects only according to the level of inflation gap in the second model. Moreover, the LR-statistics shown in Figure 2 indicate that the asymmetric effects are not very clear.
However, we proceed in the next section with testing the possible asymmetric effects in the Taylor rule. We suspect that not all coefficients change significantly when changing the inflation gap or output gap regime, especially it might not be the case of lagged interest rate coefficient.
The asymmetric Taylor rules
The results of testing the degree of dissimilarity between all (four) coefficients in each regime are presented in: Table 6 -for an inflation gap as the threshold variable and in Table 7 -for an output gap as the threshold variable.
Let us consider an asymmetric effect according to the level of the inflation gap. In case of the first model β 1 > β 2 for both the threshold variables, what suggests that the central bank reacts more aggressively to the level of inflation gap when it is high. Also in case of the second model β 1 is statistically significant and β 2 is not (see Table 6 ), what leads to the same conclusion. Concerning the output gap coefficient it appears to be higher when the output gap is relatively high (see Table 7 ) but not necessary higher when the inflation gap is high (see
Empirical results
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model 1 in Table 6 ). The periods of high level of economic activity are often associated with the periods of high level of inflation rate, thus, the results seem to indicate more active monetary policy in such economic conditions.
It is worth noting that, in some cases when dividing the sample into two subsamples we obtain statistically insignificant output gap or inflation gap coefficients. Such results might appear due to the shortness of the sample, crisis distortions 5 , as well as disturbances before 2004 when large decreases of the money market rate were observed 6 .
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When applying the second estimation method (Equation (7)) quite similar results are obtained. Concerning the direction of the asymmetry the results (presented in Table 8 )
show both that the central bank reacts more strongly to the high inflation rate ( Thus, this asymmetric effect seems to be the strongest one.
The asymmetry assigned to the level of the inflation gap might, as it was mentioned before, stem from asymmetric preferences of the central bank as it is an inflation targeter.
Whereas the asymmetry assigned to the level of output gap might stem from nonlinear to provide liquidity in the banking sector. The special policies included repo and swap operations, earlier redemption of 10 year bonds, and reduction of the reserve requirement rate by 0, 5%. 6 The process of disinflation appeared in Poland due to economic transformation from a centrally planned economy into a market economy (which began in 1989). 7 Also it is important to keep in mind that we use ex post data, which are only some approximation of the real data available to the monetary authorities when taking the decisions. Moreover, when taking consumer price index as the measure of inflation we have to be aware of the fact that there are some movements of this index which are independent of the central bank, such as changes in commodity prices. Not to mention long delays with which monetary transmission mechanism operates which might not be fully captured by the estimated equations.
4
Phillips curve. If the Phillips curve is concave central bank has to take significantly more action to reduce inflation when the level of economic activity is high. If the Phillips curve is convex it might react more aggressively to high level of economic activity because the periods of excess demand might cause severe recession to lower the inflation generated when the level of economic activity is high. But our results do not resolve which is the shape of the Phillips curve. Thus, the asymmetries in the Taylor rule seem not to result from nonlinearities in the Phillips curve. Our preliminary analysis of the Phillips curve for Poland suggests that the curve is asymmetric according to the level of output gap. But the direction of the asymmetric effect seems to strongly depend on the used specification. While using quarter on quarter CPI, the rate of inflation seems to be more strongly influenced by the output gap when the output gap is relatively high, to the contrary, while using year on year CPI, the rate of inflation seems to be more strongly influenced by the output gap when the output gap is relatively low. However, in case of the latter model the forward looking component is higher indicating higher firms' forward lookingness.
The estimations of an asymmetric Taylor N a t i o n a l B a n k o f P o l a n d
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A Unit root tests ∆ ieuro 0,000*** 0,000*** 0,091
The description of the variables is presented in the Section 2; the Real effective exchange rate gap The graphs present LR-statistics for possible values of the threshold variable. It tests whether particular value belongs to the threshold interval (Hansen 2000) . The red line corresponds to 90% critical value. The graphs present LR-statistics for possible values of the threshold variable. It tests whether particular value belongs to the threshold interval (Hansen 2000) . The red line corresponds to 90% critical value.
